Pilot Critical Incident Reports as a Means to Identify Human Factors of Remotely Piloted Aircraft by Hobbs, Alan et al.
Pilot	  cri)cal	  incident	  reports	  as	  a	  means	  to	  
iden)fy	  human	  factors	  of	  remotely	  piloted	  
aircra5	  
Alan	  Hobbs*,	  Colleen	  Cardoza*,	  Cynthia	  Null**	  
*	  San	  Jose	  State	  University/NASA	  Ames	  Research	  Center	  




Human	  challenges	  of	  remote	  pilo)ng	  
•  Loss	  of	  natural	  sensing 	  	  
•  Control	  and	  communica)on	  via	  radio	  link	  
•  Physical	  characteris)cs	  of	  control	  sta)on	  
•  In-­‐ﬂight	  transfer	  of	  control 	  	  
•  Unique	  ﬂight	  characteris)cs	  
•  Flight	  termina)on	   	  	  
•  Reliance	  on	  automa)on 	  	  
•  Interfaces	  based	  on	  consumer	  products 	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The	  problem	  
•  Lack	  of	  data	  on	  Remotely	  Piloted	  Aircra5	  Systems	  
(RPAS)	  incidents	  
•  Rela)vely	  few	  RPAS	  reports	  have	  been	  submiQed	  
to	  ASRS	  by	  RPAS	  pilots	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Cri)cal	  incident	  technique	  
•  In	  1940’s,	  researchers	  asked	  pilots	  to	  recall	  pilot	  
error	  incidents	  
– Many	  “errors”	  reﬂected	  poor	  cockpit	  design	  
– Results	  led	  to	  standardized	  cockpit	  design	  in	  modern	  
aircra5	  
	  
Major accident 1 
Minor accidents 10 
Reportable incidents 30 
Minor events 600 
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The	  current	  study	  
•  Goal:	  Examine	  the	  feasibility	  of	  a	  method	  to	  collect	  
the	  opera)onal	  experiences	  of	  RPAS	  pilots	  	  
–  Informa)on	  will	  be	  used	  to	  iden)fy	  needed	  
improvements	  in	  control	  sta)on	  design,	  procedures,	  
training,	  etc	  	  	  	  
•  Will	  provide	  independent	  and	  complementary	  data	  
to	  supplement	  NASA	  simula)ons	  and	  ﬂight	  tests	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Approach	  
•  Focus	  groups	  with	  2-­‐3	  pilots	  at	  a	  )me	  
•  Par)cipants	  asked	  to	  recall	  events	  that	  they	  have	  
experienced	  while	  opera)ng	  a	  remotely	  piloted	  
aircra5	  
1.  A	  hazardous	  situa)on	  or	  error	  
-­‐	  Could	  be	  about	  the	  design	  of	  the	  system,	  
procedures,	  communica)on,	  or	  other	  issue	  	  
2.  A	  situa)on	  where	  a	  hazardous	  situa)on	  or	  error	  was	  
iden)ﬁed	  and	  rec)ﬁed	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Approach	  
•  Par)cipant	  iden))es	  remain	  conﬁden)al	  	  




•  23	  par)cipants	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  lost	  link	  mission	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Map/charts	  




Controls	  and	  displays	  
Link	  
N	  of	  men)ons	  
Link	  
•  Inten)onal	  uses	  of	  lost	  link	  mission	  
– During	  control	  transfers,	  	  
– Exit	  from	  problem	  situa)ons.	  	  
•  Use	  of	  lost	  link	  )mer	  
– Entering	  areas	  with	  uncertain	  coverage,	  	  
– ATC	  certainty.	  
•  Mul)ple	  lost	  links	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Lost	  link	  
A	  pilot	  programmed	  “lost	  link	  okay”	  for	  a	  3-­‐hour	  
period	  of	  )me	  while	  the	  aircra5	  was	  loitering	  and	  on	  
satellite	  control.	  While	  he	  had	  the	  aircra5	  it	  actually	  
went	  into	  lost	  link	  and	  it	  was	  s)ll	  lost	  link	  when	  I	  came	  
in	  to	  take	  over.	  I	  didn’t	  want	  to	  take	  an	  aircra5	  that	  I	  
have	  no	  idea	  where	  it’s	  at	  or	  what	  it	  is	  doing.	  I	  did	  
eventually	  take	  over	  the	  aircra5	  and	  another	  GCS,	  
who	  had	  line-­‐of-­‐sight	  control,	  ﬁnally	  took	  over	  the	  
aircra5.	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
Controls	  and	  displays	  
•  Keyboard	  and	  consumer	  interfaces	  
•  May	  be	  par)cularly	  produc)ve	  of	  errors	  
•  Shared	  payload	  and	  ﬂight	  controls	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Control	  transfers	  
•  Inter-­‐control	  sta)on	  mode	  errors	  
•  Unintended	  transfers	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Data	  entry	  errors	  and	  slips	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“I	  turned	  the	  SAS	  [Stability	  Augmenta)on	  
System]	  oﬀ	  by	  accident.	  We	  use	  the	  
emergency	  red	  buQon	  to	  turn	  the	  SAS	  oﬀ,	  and	  
we	  do	  this	  during	  normal	  opera)ons	  when	  
the	  ground	  crew	  remove	  the	  chocks.	  …	  to	  
make	  sure	  the	  ground	  crew	  do	  not	  get	  hit	  if	  
the	  SAS	  moves	  a	  ﬂight	  control	  surface.	  I	  had	  
developed	  muscle	  memory	  with	  the	  
ac)va)on	  of	  the	  SAS	  disengagement	  buQon.	  
…	  I	  went	  to	  put	  the	  gear	  down,	  but	  instead	  I	  
turned	  the	  SAS	  oﬀ	  using	  the	  red	  emergency	  
buQon.	  The	  aircra5	  went	  into	  a	  20-­‐degree	  
bank	  and	  5-­‐degrees	  nose	  down.	  I	  was	  able	  to	  
recover	  the	  airplane.	  Now,	  the	  procedure	  is	  to	  
turn	  oﬀ	  the	  SAS	  using	  the	  ..[keyboard]..	  
instead	  of	  using	  the	  red	  buQon”.	  	  
Stale	  lost	  link	  
•  Pilot	  awareness	  of	  lost	  link	  mission	  
•  Lost	  link	  mission	  needs	  regular	  upda)ng	  
•  Lost	  link	  mission	  can	  be	  a	  form	  of	  “automa)on	  
surprise”	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Camera	  view	  illusions	  
“Depending	  on	  how	  I	  do	  the	  landing	  ….	  (the	  moveable	  
sensor	  camera)	  …will	  be	  used	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  we	  
clear	  the	  turns.	  But	  some)mes,	  the	  sensor	  operator	  
will	  move	  the	  	  camera,	  which	  will	  make	  it	  look	  like	  that	  
I’m	  turning	  but	  I’m	  actually	  not	  turning.	  So	  I	  have	  to	  
concentrate	  and	  make	  sure	  I	  don’t	  respond	  to	  that	  
erroneous	  camera	  view”.	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Conclusions	  and	  next	  steps	  
•  RPAS	  pilots	  are	  willing	  to	  share	  their	  
experience	  	  
•  Incident	  reports	  can	  help	  to	  iden)fy	  topics	  for	  
future	  research	  
•  Results	  will	  be	  used	  to	  inform	  	  
– Design	  guidelines	  for	  RPAS	  control	  sta)ons	  
–  Input	  to	  FAA	  &	  ICAO	  
–  Incident	  repor)ng	  systems	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